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Abstract 
The Occupation Safety and Health Administration enforces safety regulations through workplace 
inspections. To identify the effect of inspections on worker safety, this study exploits quasi-
experimental variation in inspections due to OSHA’s Site Specific Targeting plan. The SST plan 
used establishment-level data on accidents and injuries to target establishments for inspection. 
The primary inspection list consisted of establishments with case rates exceeding a cutoff. This 
cutoff generated a discontinuous increase in inspections, which is used to identify the effect of 
inspections on worker safety. Using the fuzzy regression discontinuity design and local linear 
regression, the estimated effect of an inspection on cases involving days away from work, job 
restrictions, and job transfers is -1.607 per 100 full-time equivalent workers. The effect is most 
pronounced among manufacturing establishments below the 90th percentile of the case-rate 
distribution. 
JEL No. J28; K32 
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I. Introduction 
In 2016, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration conducted approximately 32 
thousand workplace inspections, with a fiscal year budget of $553 million. While the goal of 
inspections is to enforce federal regulations of safety and health, identifying the effect of 
inspections on worker safety presents a challenge. One reason is that OSHA specifically targets 
high-risk industries and establishments for inspection (Kniesner and Leeth 2014). This generates 
a negative correlation between inspections and worker safety, which confounds any positive, 
causal effect of the former on the latter. 
To identify the effect of inspections on worker safety, this study exploits quasi-experimental 
variation in inspections generated by OSHA’s Site Specific Targeting (SST) plan. The plan, 
implemented in 1999, targeted establishments with high rates of accidents and injuries for 
inspection. The data to implement the SST plan come from the OSHA Data Initiative (ODI), which 
collected establishment-level data on accidents and injuries directly from employers. Using these 
data, the SST plan prioritized establishments for inspection using case-rate cutoffs. One set of 
cutoffs defined the primary inspection list, and a lower set of cutoffs defined the secondary 
inspection list. An even lower cutoff was used to notify employers by mail that their case rates 
were high relative to the national average. The cutoff for the primary inspection list is associated 
with a discontinuous increase in inspections, which is used to identify the effect of inspections 
on worker safety. 
To exploit the discontinuity in inspection for identification, the empirical strategy follows the 
fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001; Imbens and 
Lemieux 2008). The FRD design requires that establishments are similar just above and below the 
cutoff, and that the discontinuity in inspection is due to compliers, defined as establishments 
1 
 
that were inspected just above the cutoff, but would have not have been inspected in the 
absence of the SST plan. These assumptions are supported by examining establishment 
characteristics and inspections unrelated to the SST plan. If the identification assumptions are 
valid, the FRD estimand measures the average effect of an inspection among compliers at the 
cutoff. The study also examines whether the effect of an inspection varies across the distribution 
of worker safety outcomes. This will determine whether the average effect of an inspection 
among compliers, estimated using the FRD estimand, varies between establishments with high 
versus low case rates after the SST plan. The estimands for distributional effects come from 
Frandsen, Frolich, and Melly (2012). To estimate both the mean and distributional effects, the 
empirical strategy uses a robust, bias-correction procedure developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and 
Titiunik (2014). 
The primary data come from OSHA’s Data Initiative (ODI), conducted annually from 1996 to 
2011. The data report the employer name, establishment address, and industry. In regards to 
accidents and injuries, the data report the total case rate (TCR) and the DART rate. The TCR 
includes cases involving (1) death, (2) days away from work, (3) job transfers or restrictions, or 
(4) medical attention beyond first aid, whereas the DART rate excludes cases involving death and 
medical attention beyond first aid. These rates are calculated annually per 100 full-time 
equivalent workers. The ODI data are used to determine both the proximity to the inspection-list 
cutoff before the SST plan, as well as worker safety outcomes following the SST plan. Thus, the 
data are restricted to establishments observed at least twice, with two observations spaced four 
years apart.1 To determine inspection outcomes during the SST plan, the ODI data are linked to 
OSHA’s Integrated Management Information System. To determine union activity within an 
                                                          
1 While the ODI data were not designed as a panel, many establishments are observed in the ODI in multiple years.  
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establishment, the ODI data are linked to “notices of bargaining” filed with the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service.2 
The empirical analysis focuses on the DART rate cutoff for the primary inspection list. Using 
local linear regression, this cutoff is associated with a 22.7 percentage point increase in 
“programmed” inspections, a 17.5 percentage point increase in any citations, and a 15.4 
percentage point increase in penalties. The cutoff is not associated with a change in 
“unprogrammed” inspections, which are unrelated to the SST plan. Thus, the SST plan provides a 
sizeable discontinuity in inspections for identification. 
The effect of inspection on worker safety is most evident for the DART rate. Using the FRD 
design and local linear regression, the average effect of an inspection on the DART rate among 
compliers is -1.607 per 100 full-time equivalent workers. This estimate is statistically significant 
at the five percent level and robust to the inclusion of establishment characteristics. Moreover, 
the effect on the DART rate is most pronounced among manufacturing establishments below the 
90th percentile of the DART distribution post-inspection. Treatment effects are less evident for 
other case rates, such as the TCR, and for other industries. Treatment effects also do not differ 
significantly between union and non-union establishments, suggesting that unionization is 
neither a substitute nor a complement to workplace inspections.3  
This study contributes to a literature on the effects of OSHA inspections on worker safety. In 
general, most studies find little to no “abatement” effect of inspections on worker safety, and 
studies that do find an effect may suffer from confounding biases (Kniesner and Leeth 2004).4 
                                                          
2 DiNardo and Lee (2004) use “notices of bargaining” filed with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to 
determine union activity following a union vote. 
3 The effect of unionization on worker safety has been examined by Morantz (2009, 2013). 
4 Studies in this literature include Cooke and Gautschi (1981); Gray and Scholz (1993); Gray and Mendeloff (2005); 
Haviland et al. (2010); McCaffrey (1983); and Ruser and Smith (1991). The little to no effect of an OSHA inspection 
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These studies differ by the analysis period, the definition of treatment (inspection versus citation 
or penalty), and worker safety outcome (overall injuries versus specific accidents). To address 
selection bias, some studies exploit the timing of an inspection, arguing that establishments 
inspected earlier in the year have more time to remediate workplace hazards. One study, by 
Levine, Toffel, and Johnson (2012), use experimental data from California in 1996 to 2006. By 
exploiting random assignment of inspections among 409 establishments, they find that 
inspections reduce injuries by 9.4 percent, with no detectable effect on employment, sales, or 
firm survival. However, their sample was limited to high-risk industries in California, so their 
findings may not be generalizable to other industries or US states. 
The estimates from this study appear at the high end of effects. Relative to the average DART 
rate at the cutoff, the average effect of -1.607 amounts to a 20 percentage point reduction in 
injuries. However, this estimate pertains only to compliers near the cutoff, which is located at 
85th percentile of the DART distribution pre-inspection. While this suggests that the effect of an 
inspection on worker safety may be greater among high-risk firms, the effect is concentrated 
below the 90th percentile of the DART distribution post-inspection. This study also differs from 
related studies with respect to the data and analysis sample. Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the 
estimates of this study with those of the related literature.5 In regards to efficiency, the gains 
from reducing the DART rate at the cutoff are offset by the cost of an inspection for OSHA and 
the cost of compliance for employers. 
                                                          
on worker safety may reflect that OSHA penalties are too low (Viscusi 1979) or that safety and health standards are 
not directly related to workplace accidents (Bartel and Glenn 1985).  
5 A report by Summit Consulting (Peto et al. 2016) pursues a similar identification strategy as this study, but this 
report uses ODI data collected in 2007 only. They find small and statistically insignificant effects of an inspection on 
worker safety. A qualitatively similar result is obtained in this study when the data are restricted to the ODI data 
collected in 2007 (not shown). 
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II. Background 
The goal of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, passed by the US Congress in 1970, is “to 
assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and women.” To achieve this goal, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was created to codify and enforce 
safety and health regulations. Regulations include specification standards, such as requiring 
safety guards for machinery or equipment, as well as performance standards, such as requiring 
limits on exposure to hazardous chemicals (Kniesner and Leeth 2014). To enforce regulations, 
OSHA educates employers and employees, inspects worksites for workplace hazards, and levies 
financial penalties on employers for serious or repeated violations. 
OSHA inspections are either programmed or unprogrammed. Unprogrammed inspections 
result from fatal or catastrophic accidents, employee complaints, or referrals, while programmed 
inspections are intended to identify and abate workplace hazards before an accident or illness 
occurs. In fiscal year 2015, OSHA conducted 16,527 programmed inspections and 19,293 
unprogrammed inspections.6 Among unprogrammed inspections, 912 were due to fatal or 
catastrophic accidents, 9,037 were due to employee complaints, 4,705 were due to referrals, and 
4,639 were due to other reasons. 
In 1999, OSHA drastically changed its procedure for targeting programmed inspections. 
Before 1999, programmed inspections were targeted at industries with high rates of accidents 
and injuries. This was accomplished using industry-level data collected by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. However, after an inspection, many establishments in high-risk industries were found 
to be relatively safe. Thus, targeting high-risk industries was relatively inefficient at targeting 
high-risk establishments, since worker safety varied substantially within industries. 
                                                          
6 These figures exclude State Plan inspections, which totaled 43,105 in fiscal year 2016. 
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To better target high-risk establishments, OSHA created the OSHA Data Initiative (ODI) in 
1996. The goal of the ODI was to collect data on accidents and injuries directly from employers 
at the establishment level. The ODI survey was conducted annually from 1997 to 2011, with 
approximately 80,000 establishments surveyed each year. The survey covers manufacturing and 
industries with injury rates above the national average, except construction, and excludes 
establishments with fewer than 40 employees.7 To facilitate data collection, OSHA required 
establishments to record accidents and injuries using OSHA’s Form 300. Per the form, cases must 
be recorded if they involve death, days away from work, job transfers or restrictions, or medical 
attention beyond first aid. These data were then used to calculate case rates for the calendar 
year. The DAFWII includes cases involving days away from work; the DART includes cases 
involving days away from work and job transfers or restrictions, and the TCR includes all case 
types, including death.8 These rates are calculated and reported per 100 full-time equivalent 
workers.9 
The ODI data were then used to implement OSHA’s Site-Specific Targeting (SST) plan. The goal 
of the SST plan was to target programmed inspections at establishments with high rates of 
accidents and injuries. To target high-rate establishments, the SST plan prioritized establishments 
using case-rate cutoffs. For example, the ODI in 2003 collected case-rate data for calendar year 
2002, and the SST plan used these data to target programmed inspections from April 2004 to 
August 2005. The primary inspection list included establishments with a DART rate greater than 
15 or a DAFWII rate greater than 10. A secondary inspection list included establishments with a 
                                                          
7 In 1999, the ODI excluded establishments with fewer than 60 employees. 
8 In 2002, DART replaced LWDII due to a change in recordkeeping. The LWDII includes only cases involving lost work 
days due to injury or illness and is nearly identical to DART. 
9 To calculate case rates, the ODI asks employers to report the number of employees and the total hours worked by 
employees during the previous calendar year. This information is not reported in the ODI data. 
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DART rate greater than 10 or a DAFWII rate greater than 4. Additionally, all establishments with 
a DART rate greater than 7 were mailed a letter stating that their DART rates were high relative 
to the national average. Occasionally, the case-rate cutoffs changed, reflecting changes in the 
case-rate distribution and OSHA’s resources to conduct inspections. While all establishments on 
the primary list were targeted for an inspection, only 20 percent were ultimately inspected, and 
those that were inspected did not always have the highest case rates (US Department of Labor 
2012). The low inspection rate was attributed, in part, to limited resources (US Department of 
Labor 2012). 
III. Methodology 
The empirical objective is to identify the causal effect of an OSHA inspection on worker safety. 
The effect is identified using quasi-experimental variation in inspections generated by OSHA’s 
SST plan. Specifically, the SST established a case-rate cutoff, and establishments exceeding the 
cutoff were targeted for a programmed inspection. If this process generated a discontinuous 
increase in inspections at the cutoff, and if establishments just above and below the cutoff are 
similar, then the increase in inspections at the cutoff may be used to identify the causal effect of 
an inspection on worker safety. 
A. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity 
The empirical strategy utilizes the fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design (Hahn, Todd, 
and Van der Klaauw 2001; Imbens and Lemieux 2008) using the potential outcomes framework 
of Rubin (1974) and Holland (1986). Using this framework, each establishment has two potential 
outcomes: worker safety without an OSHA inspection, denoted 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0), and worker safety with an 
OSHA inspection, denoted 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1). For each establishment, the causal effect of an OSHA inspection 
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is defined as 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0). If worker safety is measured by the case rate, then 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 < 0 
indicates an improvement worker safety. The fundamental problem for identifying 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is that only 
one outcome – either 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(1) or 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(0) – is observed for each establishment. 
To plausibly identify causal effects, the FRD design requires three main assumptions. First, 
the inspection outcome, denoted by the variable 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, must be partially determined by whether a 
running variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 exceeds a cutoff 𝑐𝑐:  
(1) lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸[𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥] < lim𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐 𝐸𝐸[𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥]. 
In this case, the likelihood of treatment increases at the cutoff 𝑐𝑐. Second, the change in 
inspections at the cutoff is due to compliers, defined as those who are treated just above the 
cutoff, but would not have been treated in the absence of the SST plan. Third, the conditional 
mean functions 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(0)|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥] and 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌(1)|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥] are continuous near the cutoff 𝑐𝑐 with 
respect to the running variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. If so, lim𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] represents the counterfactual of 
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] in the absence of the SST plan. 
With these assumptions, the FRD estimand is given by: 
(2) 𝜏𝜏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�−lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�−lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�. 
The numerator measures the difference in the mean outcome 𝑌𝑌 above and below the cutoff, and 
the denominator measures the difference in the treatment 𝐷𝐷 above and below the cutoff. By 
dividing the former by the latter, the FRD estimand measures the average effect of treatment 
among compliers. The FRD estimand is comparable to the Wald estimator, which arises from 
instrumental variable regression with a binary instrument. 
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B. Distributional Effects 
The FRD estimand measures the average treatment effect of among compliers. However, the 
effect among compliers may differ across the distribution of the outcome variable 𝑌𝑌. On one 
hand, establishments with high 𝑌𝑌, which are presumably more dangerous, have greater scope 
for remediating workplace hazards. On the other hand, these establishments may face greater 
idiosyncratic risk beyond the purview of OSHA regulations and enforcement. Thus, the effect of 
an inspection across the distribution of the outcome variable 𝑌𝑌 is ambiguous. 
To estimate distributional effects, the cumulative density function (CDF) for 𝑌𝑌 is estimated 
among compliers just above the cutoff, where they are treated, and among counterfactual 
compliers just below the cutoff, where they are not treated. The estimands for the conditional 
CDFs are provided by (Frandsen, Frolich, and Melly 2012). Above the cutoff, the conditional CDF 
is given by: 
(3) 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(1)|Ω(𝑦𝑦) =
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�1(𝑌𝑌 ≤ 𝑦𝑦)𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�−lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�1(𝑌𝑌 ≤ 𝑦𝑦)𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�−lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥� . 
Below the cutoff, the conditional CDF is given by:  
(4) 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(0)|Ω(𝑦𝑦) =
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�1(𝑌𝑌 ≤ 𝑦𝑦)(1− 𝐷𝐷)�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�−lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�1(𝑌𝑌 ≤ 𝑦𝑦)(1 − 𝐷𝐷)�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�1 − 𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥�−lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸�1 − 𝐷𝐷�𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥� . 
Both CDFs are conditional on compliers, denoted by Ω. At each value of 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦, the distributional 
impact of treatment among compliers is measured by 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(1)|Ω(𝑦𝑦) − 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(0)|Ω(𝑦𝑦). 
C. Estimation 
Treatment effects are estimated using nonparametric, local linear regression. Local linear 
regression is appropriate because the estimands are evaluated at the cutoff, and because the 
9 
 
cutoff is located at the boundary of the bandwidth (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). The term 
lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] is estimated by solving  
(5) min
𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
∑ �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 − 𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐)�
2
Κ �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖−𝑐𝑐
ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
�𝑐𝑐≤𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖≤𝑐𝑐+ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 . 
The outcome 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is a linear function of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐, with 𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 as the intercept and 𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 as the slope. The 
objective is to minimize the sum of the squared deviations of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 from the linear function, 
weighted by the kernel function Κ �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖−𝑐𝑐
ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
�, using observations within the bandwidth of length ℎ𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹, 
from 𝑐𝑐 to 𝑐𝑐 + ℎ𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹. The solution to the minimization problem is denoted by 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 and ?̂?𝛽𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹, so the 
estimate of 𝑌𝑌 given 𝑋𝑋 is 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹 + ?̂?𝛽𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹(𝑋𝑋 − 𝑐𝑐), and the estimate of lim𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] is 𝛼𝛼�𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹. Similarly, 
lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] is estimated by solving 
(6) min
𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌,𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
∑ �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 − 𝛽𝛽𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐)�
2
Κ �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖−𝑐𝑐
ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌
�𝑐𝑐−ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌≤𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖<𝑐𝑐 . 
The terms lim
𝑥𝑥↓𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸[𝐷𝐷|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] and lim
𝑥𝑥↑𝑐𝑐
𝐸𝐸[𝐷𝐷|𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥] are estimated by replacing 𝑌𝑌 with 𝐷𝐷.  
The estimation is accomplished using a robust, bias-correction procedure developed by 
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). This procedure determines the optimal bandwidth ℎ, 
corrects for the bias of ?̂?𝜏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 when estimated using local linear regression, and calculates robust 
standard errors that reflect that the bias correction is stochastic. The procedure also allows for 
controls for observable characteristics. The optimal bandwidth is calculated for the outcome 𝑌𝑌, 
assuming ℎ𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = ℎ𝑌𝑌𝐹𝐹, and this bandwidth is used for the inspection outcome 𝐷𝐷. The default for 
the kernel function Κ(. ) is triangular. 
IV. Data 
The primary data come from OSHA’s Data Initiative (ODI). Stated above, the ODI collected 
data on accidents and injuries at the establishment level from 1996 to 2011. The data report the 
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establishment name and address, including the street number, street name, city, state, and zip 
code. The data also report the establishment’s industry using the Standard Industrialization 
Classification codes (SIC). In regards to accidents and injuries, the data report the TCR, the DART, 
and the DAFWII, though the DAFWII is only available for calendar years 2002 and beyond. 
The empirical analysis focuses on the DART cutoff for the primary inspection list, so the 
running variable 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is measured by the DART rate reported in the ODI. While the SST plan had 
multiple cutoffs for the primary and secondary inspection lists, only the DART cutoff exhibits a 
sizeable discontinuity in inspections. Alternative cutoffs are discussed in section VII. 
The inspection indicator 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  is obtained by merging the ODI data to the universe of OSHA 
inspections as of September, 2016.10 These data come from OSHA’s Integrated Management 
Information System. For each inspection, the data report whether the inspection was 
programmed or unprogrammed, the citations recorded during the inspection, and the penalties 
levied for each citation, if any. The inspection indicator 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  is measured within the SST plan cycle. 
For example, the ODI in 2003 collected case-rate data for calendar year 2002, and the SST plan 
used these data to target programmed inspections from April 2004 to August 2005. Thus, for that 
cycle, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  measures inspection outcomes from April 2004 to August 2005.  
The outcome variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is measured from the ODI in the calendar year after the SST cycle. In 
the example above, inspections under the SST plan occurred from April 2004 to August 2005, so 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is the case rate in the ODI data in 2006. While the ODI data were not designed as a panel, many 
establishments are observed in the ODI in multiple years. 
The covariates 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖  include sets of dummy variables for calendar year, state, industry, and an 
indicator of union activity. State and industry are reported in the ODI. Using the SIC codes, 
                                                          
10 The merging procedure is described in the Appendix. 
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industry is categorized into three groups: manufacturing (SIC 20 to 39), health services (SIC 80), 
and other. To obtain information on union activity, the ODI data are merged to “notices of 
bargaining” filed with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). A notice must be 
filed to modify a union contract and thus indicate union activity within an establishment. The 
FMCS data include all notices filed from 2004 to 2016. The data report the date of the notice and 
the name and address of the establishment, including the street number, street name, city, state, 
and zip code. Using the FMCS data, a union indicator variable is created that equals one if there 
is any union activity and zero otherwise. 
The steps used to match the ODI to the IMIS and the FMCS are discussed in the Appendix. 
V. Sample 
The analysis sample is derived from the ODI using five restrictions. First, the data are 
restricted to years 1997 to 2011, since ODI data in 1996 were not used to implement the SST 
plan. The pooled data contain 951,077 observations for 328,751 establishments. Second, 
observations are excluded if they appear to duplicate a record or if the establishment’s name and 
address are missing, eliminating 0.44 percent of the sample. Third, the data are stacked by 
establishment by year, and the sample is restricted to pairs of observations spaced four years 
apart. This yields 225,215 observation pairs, with the first year ranging from 1997 to 2007. Fourth, 
the data are restricted to states covered by the SST plan, which includes all states under federal 
jurisdiction with respect to OSHA and a few states that are not. In total, twenty-seven states were 
covered by the SST plan throughout the analysis period, and an additional eight states were 
covered at some point during the analysis period. Finally, observations pairs are excluded if the 
case rate from the ODI is missing or exceeds 100, eliminating 1.9 percent of the sample. The 
resulting analysis sample contains 154,808 observation pairs. 
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Table 1 presents summary statistics of the analysis sample. The first column reports statistics 
for the entire sample; the second column reports statistics for establishments with DART rates 
from four below the cutoff to four above the cutoff; and the last two columns divide 
establishments into those just below and above the SST cutoff. 
As shown, the SST cutoff is located near the top of the DART rate distribution. Among all 
establishments, the mean DART rate is 7.33, and the mean SST cutoff is 13.67. To illustrate the 
distribution, Figure 1 plots the distribution of the DART relative to the SST. The distribution is 
skewed to the right, and the cutoff is located near the 85th percentile. This means that, in this 
study, compliers are relatively high-risk firms. Additionally, the density is smooth near the 
cutoff.11 This suggests that establishments do not bunch just below the cutoff to avoid inspection, 
which could potentially violate the identification assumption that establishments are similar just 
above and below the threshold. The absence of bunching through gaming seems reasonable, 
since establishments report their DART rates before SST cutoffs are determined. 
Consistent with the SST plan, programmed inspections were more frequent just above the 
cutoff than just below. In Table 1, the rate of inspections were 31.9 percent just above the cutoff, 
but 10.2 percent just below. To illustrate the difference at the threshold, panel A of Figure 2 plots 
the likelihood of a programmed inspection by the DART rate relative to the SST cutoff. The 
markers denote the mean outcome within intervals of 0.5, and the lines are derived from second-
order local polynomial regression, estimated separately above and below the cutoff. As shown, 
the difference in inspection above and below the cutoff occurs at cutoff, as required for 
identification using the FRD design. Additionally, increased programmed inspections led to 
greater rates of citations and penalties, as shown in Table 1 and panels B and C of Figure 2. In 
                                                          
11 A test by McCrary (2008) rejects that there is a discontinuity in the distribution at the cutoff. 
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contrast, there is no change in unprogrammed inspections at the cutoff, as shown in panel D of 
Figure 2. 
Establishments also appear similar just above and below the SST cutoff with respect to 
observable characteristics. Among all establishments, approximately 61.0 percent are in 
manufacturing, 17.5 percent are in health services, and 12.5 percent exhibit union activity. Figure 
3 plots these characteristics by the DART relative to the threshold, which shows that these 
characteristics are relative stable throughout the DART distribution, with no measurable change 
at the discontinuity.12  
Finally, the TCR and the DART exhibit substantial mean reversion, a finding consistent with 
Ruser (1995). This is evident in Table 1 by comparing the baseline case rates, denoted by the 
subscript 𝑡𝑡, to the rates four years later, denoted with the subscript 𝑡𝑡 + 4. Among all 
establishments, the TCR falls from 12.8 to 9.5, and the DART falls from 7.3 to 5.7. Mean reversion 
should not invalidate the identification strategy, however, if the extent of mean reversion is 
similar above and below the cutoff. 
VI. Results 
A. Inspection Outcomes 
The first step is to estimate the discontinuity in inspection outcomes at the cutoff. Panel A of 
Table 2 presents the estimated discontinuity and the optimal bandwidth using local linear 
regression without covariates. As shown, the cutoff is associated with a 22.7 percent point 
increase in programmed inspections, a 17.5 percentage point increase in citations, and a 15.4 
                                                          
12 The change in these characteristics at the cutoff are estimated using local linear regression. All estimated changes 
are small and statistically insignificant. 
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percentage point increase in penalties. These estimates are statistically significant at the one 
percent level and robust to the inclusion of covariates, as shown in panel B. 
The final column of Table 2 presents the results for unprogrammed inspections, which were 
not directly affected by the SST plan. As expected, there is no discontinuous change in 
unprogrammed inspections at the cutoff. 
B. Mean Effects 
The increase in programmed inspections at the cutoff is used to identify the effect of an 
inspection on worker safety. To examine this effect graphically, Figure 4 plots case rates in the 
first calendar year after the SST cycle. Panel A plots the TCR, and panel B plots the DART. In both 
figures, the mean case rates appear to decrease discontinuously at the cutoff, suggesting that 
inspections improve worker safety. 
The FRD estimand in equation (2) relates the change in case rates to the change in 
inspections, both measured at the cutoff. With the assumptions outlined above, the FRD 
estimand represents the causal effect of an inspection among compliers. 
The left side of Table 3 presents the baseline estimates of the FRD estimand. The estimates 
are presented separately for the TCR and the DART, and the inspection outcome is any 
programmed inspection during the SST cycle. As shown, an inspection has a negative effect on 
both the TCR and the DART, but only the latter effect is statistically significant. Without 
covariates, the estimated effect on the TCR is -0.569, and the estimated effect on the DART rate 
is -1.607, measured per 100 full-time equivalent workers. Relative to the mean DART rate of 7.5 
(Table 1), the effect on the DART amounts to a decrease of approximately 20 percent. The 
estimates are robust to the inclusion of covariates. 
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The right side of Table 3 presents estimates using data from 1998 to 2007. This allows 
consideration of a third outcome, the DAFWII, which is only available for calendar years 2002 and 
beyond. As shown, all three estimated effects are negative, but only the effect on the DART is 
statistically significant. Without covariates, the estimated effect on the DART is -1.877 per 100 
full-time equivalent workers. The estimated effects on the TCR and the DAFWII are smaller in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
In both panels, the estimates for the DART rate are larger than the estimates for the TCR or 
the DAFWII. A possible mechanism is that inspections reduced the severity of cases involving job 
restrictions or transfers to require only medical attention beyond first aid. Cases involving job 
restrictions and transfers are included in the TCR and the DART, but not the DAFWII, and cases 
involving medical attention beyond first aid are included in the TCR, but not the DART or DAFWII. 
Thus, the proposed mechanism would decrease the DART rate, but less so the TCR and the 
DAFWII. However, the standard errors for all the estimated effects are large and thus do not rule 
out a wide range of effects. 
C. Distributional Effects 
The effect of an inspection may vary between high-risk and low-risk firms. To explore this 
possibility, the distributional effects of an inspection are examined using equations (3) and (4). 
Equation (3) presents the CDF of compliers when treated, and equation (4) represents the CDF 
of counterfactual compliers when not treated. The equations are estimated separately for 
integers of 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑦𝑦, from zero to sixteen, using local linear regression. 
Figure 5 illustrates the estimated distributional effects for the DART rate. Panel A plots the 
estimates of 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(1)|Ω(𝑦𝑦) and 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(0)|Ω(𝑦𝑦), and panel B plots their difference and its 95 percent 
confidence interval. As shown, the effect of inspections is concentrated at bottom of the DART 
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distribution. Starting at 𝑌𝑌 = 0, the difference in the conditional CDFs is approximately 11 
percentage points, which is statistically significant at the one percent level. The difference 
remains positive and statistically significant up to 𝑌𝑌 = 8, though the 95 percent confidence 
intervals widen substantially. The difference then converges towards zero near the 92nd 
percentile. At that point, the difference is approximately one percent and statistically 
insignificant. Thus, the effects of an inspection on the DART rate occur predominately below the 
90th percentile. 
D. Effects by Industry and Union Status 
The effect of an inspection may also differ by industry. Differences may arise due to different 
occupational hazards, effective regulatory standards, and scopes for improvement. To explore 
this possibility, the models are estimated separately for manufacturing, health services, and 
“other” industries, with the DART rate as the outcome. The left side of Table 4 presents mean 
effects, and Figure 6 illustrates distributional effects. For brevity, the figure plots the estimates 
of 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(1)|Ω(𝑦𝑦) and 𝐹𝐹𝑌𝑌(0)|Ω(𝑦𝑦), but not their difference. 
According to the results, the effect of an inspection on worker safety is most evident for 
manufacturing, particularly below the 90th percentile. In regards to the mean effect, the estimate 
for manufacturing is -1.257 per 100 full-time equivalent workers, compared to 0.626 for health 
services and -0.124 for “other” industries. However, none of these estimates is statistically 
significant. In regards to distributional effects in manufacturing, there are sizeable differences 
between the conditional CDFs up to the 90th percentile, most of which are statistically significant. 
In contrast, there are no statistically significant differences in the conditional CDFs in health 
services or “other” industries. 
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Another consideration is whether the effects of an inspection vary by union status. On one 
hand, unions may increase the effect of an inspection, since union officials often accompany 
safety inspectors during the workplace inspection. On the other hand, unions may decrease the 
effect of an inspection, since union officials often work with management independently to 
improve worker safety (Eaton and Nocerino 2000). Thus, unions may be a complement or 
substitute to regulatory oversight – and workplace inspections, in particular (Morantz 2009; 
Morantz 2013). 
The right side of Table 4 presents the mean effects, and Figure 7 illustrates the distributional 
effects. According to the results, the effect of an inspection on worker safety is qualitatively 
similar among union and non-union establishments. In Table 4, the estimates for union and non-
union establishments are -3.536 and -1.414, respectively, though neither estimate is statistically 
significant. In regards to distributional effects, there are notable differences in the conditional 
CDFs up to the 90th percentile for both union and non-union establishments. The only differences 
that are statistically significant are those among non-union establishments below the 65th 
percentile. Taken together, the results cannot reject that the effect of an inspection on worker 
safety is similar among union and non-union establishments.  
VII. Additional Considerations 
A. Treatment Variable 
Thus far, the treatment variable has been defined as a programmed inspection. However, the 
effect of an inspection on worker safety may be limited to those that result in citations or 
penalties (Gray and Scholz 1993; Gray and Mendeloff 2005; Haviland et al. 2012). This is because 
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the mechanism for the effect is through the identification and remediation of workplace hazards, 
which is most likely to occur if the inspection results in a citation. 
To address this issue, the model of the DART rate with covariates is estimated separately with 
a citation and penalty as the treatment variable. In the baseline case, where the treatment 
variable is a programmed inspection, the discontinuity in inspections is 22.4 percentage points, 
and the estimated effect of a programmed inspection on the DART rate is -1.607 per 100 full-
time equivalent workers. When the treatment variable is a citation, these estimates are 17.2 
percentage points and -2.22, respectively; when the treatment variable is a penalty, these 
estimates are 15.3 percentage points and -2.46, respectively. All estimates are statistically 
significant at the five percent level. Thus, if the treatment is defined as an inspection resulting in 
either a citation or penalty, the estimated treatment effect increases. 
B. Alternative SST Cutoffs 
Thus far, the empirical analysis has focused on the DART cutoff for the primary inspection list. 
However, stated above, a lower set of cutoffs defined a secondary inspection list, and an even 
lower cutoff determined which establishments received a letter stating that their case rate was 
high relative to the national average. An important consideration is whether these cutoffs 
affected the likelihood of an inspection or worker safety. 
In regards to the secondary inspection list, the DART cutoff is associated with a small increase 
in programmed inspections, but there is no measurable change in worker safety. For example, 
using local linear regression with covariates, the discontinuity in programmed inspections is 3.76 
percentage points, which is statistically significant at the five percent level, but the change in the 
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DART rate is 0.074, with a standard error of 0.127.13 Similarly, the cutoff for the letter is 
associated with a small increase in programmed inspections, but there is no measurable change 
in worker safety. Using local linear regression with covariates, the discontinuity in programmed 
inspections is 1.47 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the five percent level, 
but the change in the DART rate is 0.201, with a standard error of 0.121. Thus, alternative cutoffs 
are not associated with a substantial increase in programmed inspections or a change in worker 
safety. 
C. Non-Federal States 
ODI data were collected in 45 US states and the District of Columbia, but the SST plan was 
only implemented in 35 states, including 29 states under federal jurisdiction with respect to 
OSHA. Thus, as a placebo test, the empirical analysis is repeated for non-federal states, as if the 
SST plan had been implemented. As expected, the DART cutoff for the primary inspection list is 
not associated with a change in programmed inspections or worker safety. For example, using 
local linear regression with covariates, the discontinuity in programmed inspections is 1.05 
percentage points, with a standard error 1.09, and the discontinuity in the DART rate is -0.028, 
with a standard error of 0.250. Thus, as expected, the DART cutoff is not associated with a change 
in programmed inspections or worker safety in states that are not covered by the SST plan. 
VIII. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study examines the effect of an OSHA inspection on worker safety. To identify the effect, 
the study exploits quasi-experimental variation in inspections due to OSHA’s SST plan. Due to the 
identification strategy, the effect of an OSHA inspection is identified among establishments near 
                                                          
13 A secondary inspection list was not specified in some years, so the sample size is reduced to 137,848. 
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the 85th percentile of the DART rate distribution pre-inspection. Using the fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design and local linear regression, the causal effect of an inspection on the DART 
rate is approximately -1.607 per 100 full-time equivalent workers. Relative to the mean, this 
effect is a reduction of approximately 20 percent. The effect is most pronounced among 
manufacturing establishments below the 90th percentile of the DART rate distribution post-
inspection. 
The estimated effect of an OSHA inspection on worker safety from this study is large 
compared to related studies. As stated, most studies find little to no “abatement” effect of 
inspections on worker safety (Kniesner and Leeth 2004). However, it is difficult to reconcile the 
results from this study, since studies differ in regards to identification strategy, data, population 
of interest, and worker safety outcomes. 
An important consideration is whether the gains from reducing the DART rate exceed the 
costs. According to Viscusi and Aldy (2003), the value of statistical injury ranges from $20 
thousand to $70 thousand. Thus, the value of reducing the DART rate by -1.607 ranges from $32 
thousand to $112 thousand per 100 full-time equivalent workers. This value is offset by the cost 
of an inspection for OSHA and the cost of compliance for employers. In 2016, the average cost of 
an OSHA inspection was $6,511. This figure is derived by dividing the total OSHA budget on 
federal enforcement in 2016 of $208 million by the number of federal OSHA inspections of 
31,948. The cost of compliance for employers is more difficult to estimate. To shed light on these 
costs, the IMIS data are used to determine the most common citations among establishments in 
the analysis sample and to estimate the effect of an inspection on the number of citations at the 
cutoff. Table 5 presents the results for all citations as well as the nine most common citations 
separately. As shown, an inspection increased the number of all citations by 5.251. The most of 
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the common citations are associated with manufacturing, with the exception of “bloodborne 
pathogens.” To address additional citations after an inspection, employers face direct costs, such 
as retrofitting machines, as well as indirect costs, such as lost productivity. While no attempt is 
made here to quantify these costs, previous research suggests that compliance costs may be 
substantial (Kniesner and Leeth 2014).  
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Appendix 
This study uses establishment-level data from OSHA’s Data Initiative (ODI) matched to 
records on notices of union bargaining from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
(FMCS) and inspection records from the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS). This 
section provides the procedures used to link these datasets. 
The analysis sample is derived from the ODI, which provides establishment-level data on 
accidents and injuries. The sample is limited to establishments observed at least twice, with the 
two observations spaced exactly four years. To link multiple observations of an establishment 
across years, the establishment name and address were standardized. All special characters, such 
as @, #, and /, were removed. For the establishment name, common words such as “Company”, 
“Corporation”, and “Co,” were deleted. Some establishments operated under a different name 
as their parent company, often indicated by “DBA,” an acronym for, “doing business as.” In these 
cases, the establishment name is separated into two, with the second name as a new variable. 
For the establishment address, floor numbers, suite numbers, and room numbers were removed. 
Common words such as “Street”, “Road”, and “Avenue” are standardized to abbreviations “St”, 
“Rd”, and “Ave”. For city names, we construct a list of all the city-state combinations that appear 
in ODI and matched them to a list of city names from Census. Any city-state combinations with 
no match to the list were checked manually for errors in either the state or the spelling of the 
city. Duplicates of the same establishment (based on the identifier we generated) in the same 
year are deleted (less than one percent of the sample). 
The ODI data are then linked to the inspection data during the SST cycle from the Integrated 
Management Information System (IMIS). IMIS includes the universe of the inspections conducted 
by OSHA from 1970 and reports the name and address of the inspected establishments, including 
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street address, zip code, city, and state, which are used to link ODI data. The establishment name 
and address are standardized using the same method used to standardize the ODI data. The ODI 
data are then matched to the IMIS data using several criteria. If an establishment is matched 
successfully based on one criterion, the establishment and its inspection record are removed 
from subsequent matching. First, establishments matched based on the establishment name and 
street address within the same city and state. This step is repeated for establishments with two 
names. Then, establishments are matched based on establishment name and 5-digit zip code 
within the same city and state. Third, establishments are matched based on the first six letters of 
the establishment name and street address (excluding spaces). Finally, establishments are 
matched based on street address within the same city and state, after manually verifying a match 
of the establishment name, and on establishment name, after manually verifying a match on the 
street address. 
The ODI data are also linked to the universe of notices of bargaining filed with Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS). The universe of notices are available from 2004 to 
2016. Because unions must file a notices with the FMCS to modify an existing contract, these 
notices indicate whether any collective bargaining activity occurs within an establishment 
(DiNardo and Lee, 2004). Again, the establishment name and address are standardized, and the 
ODI data are matched to the FMCS data using several criteria. An establishment is assumed 
unionized if there is any match to a record in FMCS. This assumption can be checked among 
establishments matched to both the FMCS and the IMIS, since the inspection data also report 
whether the establishment is unionized. Among these establishments, 89.3 percent with a match 
to the FMCS are unionized according to the IMIS, and only 10.8 percent without a matched to 
the FMCS are unionized. Thus, a match to the FMCS is highly correlated with union status. 
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